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Abstract
We analyze how the entry of less informed participants in a market
for a risky asset aﬀects the volatility of the price of the asset. In an
endogenous participation model, we show that in equilibrium the new
market entrants are less informed than the rest of the participants.
We study how volatility depends on market participation and on the
level of information of the participants. The condition that guarantees
that new market participation leads to increased asset price volatil-
ity, is that all investors are suﬃciently risk-averse. In the increasing
volatility case, a higher volatility is associated with a higher welfare
for the new entrants.
(JEL: G12, D40, C70)
KEYWORDS: endogenous participation, volatility, information het-
erogeneity.
1 Introduction
D u r i n gt h ep a s ty e a r s ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ra n di nt h ed i v e r s i t yo f
traders has generated changes in ﬁnancial asset markets. For instance, US
stock market participation has increased consistently since the ﬁfties and this
increase has been most dramatic in the eighties and nineties. The number of
shareholders in the United States increased by more than 60% from 1989 to
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11998, when it reached approximately 84 million individuals.1 Since 1995, a
great number of new investors began purchasing assets in ﬁnancial markets
worldwide especially through the Internet.2
It is interesting to understand the eﬀects of this change in participation
on prices of ﬁnancial assets and in particular on the volatility of those prices.
One explanation for this increase in participation in the stock market is a
decrease in the cost of entry in the market. Whereas in the past higher
transaction and information costs kept certain types of investors out of risky
asset markets, nowadays the easier access has attracted new types of in-
vestors into ﬁnancial markets. As a result of information technology and
telecommunications improvements, there is no doubt that the cost of acquir-
ing information on assets declined dramatically in the past years. However,
while there may be a consensus that the lowering of the pecuniary (broker-
age) and non-pecuniary (information and setup) costs of participation has
encouraged the entry of new investor-types into asset markets, whether these
new market participants have increased or decreased the asset price volatility
is a question that still needs theoretical and empirical exploration.
In the quest to study under what conditions asset price volatility increases
with more market participation and what are the relevant factors that aﬀect
the volatility in one way or the other, we focus in this paper on how the
heterogeneity in information of market participants aﬀects price volatility.
We are interested in this question because it is not obvious what happens
to volatility as new less informed but rational participants enter the market.
For instance, you may think that traders with less information have noisier
beliefs which induce noisier demands and hence a higher randomness to the
aggregate demand. Less informed traders if they are Bayesian though, must
also rely less on their less precise information and more on the public infor-
mation. So their demands will not necessarily be noisier or more volatile.3
The present work is one step in the direction of exploring the possible
“origins” of price volatility of ﬁnancial assets. We use an endogenous market
participation model to show how volatility emerges from the self-selection
of potential investors. As we show, this source of volatility is an immedi-
ate consequence of the change in the overall composition of the information
1According to the Survey of Consumer Finances (1998).
2From 1995 through mid-2000, investors opened 12.5 million on-line brokerage accounts,
as Barber and Odean document (JEP 2001).
3For the same reason, it is also not obvious for instance that the lower the precision of
the information of the new market participants, the higher the price volatility becomes.
2precision of investors. The change in the composition of market participants
follows from the easier access to the stock market allowing the entry of new
investors. We analyze the diﬀerent participation equilibria that arise from a
market entry game as the cost of entry in the asset market is lowered. Dif-
ferent participation equilibria imply diﬀerent price volatilities, depending on
what types of investors enter the asset market.4 First, we ﬁnd that the more
informed types enjoy a higher beneﬁt than the less informed types from par-
ticipating in a risky asset market. This happens because the market is not
perfectly revealing. Even after observing the partially revealing price, the
information of the less informed remains less precise than the information
of the more informed investors. As a consequence, for a high cost of mar-
ket participation, the more informed are the only types to enter the market.
For low entry costs, all investors enter the market. However for intermedi-
ate entry costs, there are multiple participation equilibria: low information
types may or may not decide to join the high information types in the mar-
ket. Second, we characterize the conditions under which the entry of new
(less informed) rational investors increases price volatility. More participa-
tion increases volatility provided that the market is suﬃciently risk-averse
a n dp r o v i d e dt h a ti nt h em a r k e tt h e r e are enough noise traders. We also
ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, volatility is more “likely” to increase the lower is
the information precision of the new market entrants. Lastly, when multi-
ple participation equilibria arise the full participation equilibrium is Pareto
dominant, implying that if volatility increases, higher welfare is associated
with higher volatility.
To explore the eﬀect on volatility of information heterogeneity, we formu-
late the problem in the following way. We assume that the characteristics
of the market (the volatility and the utility of participants) stay the same
if more investors with the same information as the incumbents enter the
market (we call this assumption scale invariance). We study what happens
to volatility and utility of the participants if less-informed traders decide to
enter the market, instead than investors with the same information. To ﬁnd
the equilibrium price and study its volatility we use a rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) concept. Hence, on top of having more informed and less
informed investors or potential market participants, we need to add some
form of noise to generate trade and to maintain an imperfectly revealing
4For a similar analysis based on heterogeneity on risk-aversion rather than heterogeneity
on information see Herrera (2002).
3equlibrium price. We adopt the noise trader modelling strategy. A model
with a ﬁxed number of noise traders is inconvenient because the noise per
agent is decreasing on the number of market participants, if the number of
noise traders remains constant. In order to maintain the market scale invari-
ant, we assume that the number of noise traders is the same as the number of
rational investors. This can be visualized as if every investors (more or less
informed) upon entering the market brings in the market one noise trader
as well. This way we eliminate one channel of distortions: the gains from
entering of an additional trader depend only on his information precision. To
eliminate another channel of distortions induced by the change in the number
of participants, we assume that the asset is in zero net supply on average, so
that the per-investor supply of the asset remains constant as participation
changes.
Related papers are Allen and Gale (1994) and Pagano (1989). These
papers also study the link between volatility and participation treating the
latter endogenously. They focus though on heterogeneity in liquidity needs,
risk aversion and hedging needs and abstract from any analysis of informa-
tion. To the best of our knowledge no previous work has explored the eﬀects
of information heterogeneity on asset prices and volatility in an endogenous
participation setting.
Orosel (1998) analyzes a model in which participation is determined en-
dogenously and ﬂuctuates over time. He shows that there is a positive link
between movements in prices and ﬂuctuations in participation. In his model
the reason why prices ﬂuctuate are changes in endogenous participation,
triggered by innovation in dividends that follow a Markov process. The en-
dogenous ﬂuctuations of market participation lead to increased volatility of
the share price. In our model instead, volatility is not related to endogenous
ﬂuctuations in market participation. Although diﬀerent across equilibria,
market participation is ﬁx e dw i t h i ne a c he q u i l i b r i u m .T h er e a s o nb e i n gt h a t
we want to explore what forces aﬀect volatility as a consequence of a change
in the composition of market participants.
Most of the other work in the limited participation literature takes a dif-
ferent approach, see for instance Merton (1987), Basak and Cuoco (1998) and
Shapiro (2002). These papers do not treat participation endogenously, but
assume that certain exogenously chosen agents are prevented from investing
in some given ﬁnancial assets.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .S e c t i o n2s e t su pt h ef o r m a l
model and ﬁnds the link between price volatility and the composition of the
4market participants. Section 3 takes the composition of market participants
as endogenous and ﬁnds the participation equilibria. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are three types of investors: informed, uninformed (or less informed)
and noise traders. The noise traders trade for reasons exogenous to the model





We assume there are a continuum γ ∈ [0,Γ] of informed investor-participants,
ac o n t i n u u mµ ∈ [0,M] of uniformed investors. As was discussed before, we
will assume that there is a noise trader per rational investor, and hence
γ +µ ∈ [0,Γ + M] noise traders. Assuming that the number of noise traders
per “rational” investors is 1 is without loss of generality, since the parameter
Q can be adjusted in order to have more or less noise per rational trader. The
letters γ and µ indicate the number of participants of every kind, whereas Γ
and M indicate the total number of potential participants. We assume that
the informed traders know all the available information about the return of
the risky asset. The price (as information aggregation) does not reveal to
them any additional information. Formally, we assume that all informed
traders receive the same signal sI, which is the asset return x plus a noise
term f :
s





f ∼ N (0,1)
We assume that the uninformed investors receive a signal that is always less
informative than the informed signal. We model this by adding a noise term
g to the informed signal:
s






0 ≤ G ≤ 1

















Only Hold Safe Asset  
Figure 1: Timing of Decisions
Our framework has three periods and entails two sequential decisions
made by investors: in the ﬁrst period, an entry decision in a risky asset mar-
ket; in the second period (only in the case of entry) a portfolio allocation
decision involving the risky asset and a safe asset. In the third period all
uncertain returns are realized. As customary in the endogenous participa-
tion literature (see for instance, Pagano 1989 or Allen and Gale 1994), the
entry decision is separated and precedes the portfolio decision. This entry
cost represents the cost of gathering information about how the stock market
works in general (setup cost) and about the returns of the stocks in partic-
ular (information cost). Only after an investor has gathered the necessary
i n f o r m a t i o n( e n t e r e dt h em a r k e t ) ,i sh ea b l et od e c i d eh o wm u c ht oi n v e s ti n
the asset.
Since the problem has two stages, we solve backwards. Starting with the
second stage decision, we ﬁnd every investor’s posterior beliefs, their demand
for the risky asset and aggregate these demands, taking as given the number
of market participants, which is derived later when we solve the ﬁrst stage
problem. Solving for the REE equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium price
of the asset and the indirect utility from entry of every market participant as
a function of the number of participants. Comparing the utility from entry
6minus the entry cost to the utility of not entering, we obtain the entry condi-
tion which determines the ﬁrst stage entry decision. Finally, we look for the
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria of the entry game and ﬁnd the equilibrium
number of participants. Diﬀerent equilibrium levels of participation imply
diﬀerent volatilities of the asset price, which was previously derived in the
second stage.
The random elements of the model are X =( x,f,g,q)
T ∼ N (0,S) (T












As customary in a REE , we assume a linear price conjecture. Agents
conjecture that the price has a linear form, that depends on their signal and
on the noise traders’ actions:
p = Bs
I + Cs
U + Dq (1)
where B,C,D are constants to be determined. To evaluate the demands, we
need to calculate the posterior expectations of the market participants.
2.1 Posterior Moments of the Informed


















is joint normal with mean (0,0,0) and variance







X−1 +1 ( X−1 +1 )( B + C)
(X−1 +1 )( B + C)( X−1 +1 )( B + C)
2 +( G−1 − 1)C2 + Q−1D2
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2.2 Posterior Moments of the Un-informed
















B + CB + CCD


its distribution is joint normal with mean (0,0,0) and variance matrix Vu =







X−1 + G−1 (X−1 +1 )( B + C)+( G−1 − 1)C
(X−1 +1 )( B + C)+( G−1 − 1)C (X−1 +1 )( B + C)
2 +( G−1 − 1)C2 + Q−1D2
¶

















(D2G − QBC (1 − G))sU +( 1− G)BQp
XQG|Ω|


















QB2 (1 − G)+D2
XQG|Ω|
2.3 Equilibrium






=( w − c)+( x − p)Z
j
8where w is the wealth before entering the market, c is the cost of entering, x
is the (random) return of the risky asset, p is the unit price of the risky asset
and Zj is the quantity demanded. Upon receiving their signals and observing














where b is a risk-aversion parameter. That is, they must choose between the







E (x | sj,p) − p
bV ar(x | sj,p)
,j = I,U
We have that optimal demands are
ZI =
sI − (1 + X)p
b
ZU =
(D2G − QBC (1 − G))sU + ((1 − G)(1− (1 + X)B)BQ− D2 (X + G))p
b(QB2 (1 − G)+D2)
so that the demand-supply equality condition yields:
(γ + µ)q + µZU + γZI =0
Using the equations for ZI and ZU in this equation and deﬁning r =
µ
γ
we obtain an equation for p, which equated term by term with the price
conjecture (1) and using k ≡
Q
b2, yields the following coeﬃcients (using X =
x − 1 and G = g +1 ):
C =
r(1 + r)(g +1 )
(1 + r)(x + r(x + g)) − kxg
B =
1+r − kg
(1 + r)(x + r(x + g)) − kxg
D =( 1 + r)bB
E = B + C















In order to calculate the variance of the price under limited participation,






We compare the volatility in full participation to volatility in limited partic-
ipation. The following proposition is one of the main results of the paper. It
characterizes the conditions under which the entry of less informed investors
increases the volatility of the asset price. It also allows us to separate the
dependance on noise and risk aversion from all the other characteristics of the
market, such as the composition of its participants r, their overall precision
of information X and the diﬀerential in information between the informed
and the uninformed G.
Proposition 1 Volatility increases with the entry of less informed investors,









r(1 + r)(g + x)+2 g −
q
(1 + r)(g − rx)4g +( r(1 + r))




High noise trading (Q−1) and high risk-aversion (b2) guarantee that volatil-
ity increases with more participation. This happens for the following reasons.
As new less informed participants enter the market, the impact of noise
traders on the price increases, because the market is overall less informed
and can distinguish less eﬀectively noise from real information. Moreover,
a more risk averse market can arbitrage away less the price misalignements
c a u s e db yn o i s et r a d e r s . T h i sh a p p e n sb e c a u s em o r er i s ka v e r s ea g e n t sa r e
willing to take less risky positions and engage in smaller trades, hence allow-
ing larger mismatches between price and real information. To see this eﬀect,
take the extreme case of a risk-neutral market. With risk-neutral agents noise
has no inﬂuence on the price. The demand is perfectly elastic and the price
responds to news one to one: p = E(x|sI). The price misalignements (caused
by noise) are arbitraged away by the larger trades taken by highly risk-
tolerant agents (higher volume), i.e., the riskier positions that the agents are
willing to take. If there is small noise and/or high risk-aversion price volatil-
ity can increase with more participation. The reason is that as less informed
10participants enter the market a volatility-reducing eﬀect is also present. The
aggregate response of the market to “relevant” news decreases, because the
less informed respond less to their information. The lower signal-reaction of
the less informed makes the market overall less responsive to information,
because the less informed participants rely more on their prior beliefs. The
stronger average weight assigned to the common prior tends to lower the
unconditional volatility when the new less informed participants enter the
market. We call this the common prior eﬀect.
It is interesting to study how the upper bound K, which determines
the volatility-increasing condition, depends on the parameters. The lower it
is, the “more likely” is volatility to increase with more participation. The
following Proposition gives the comparative statics for K with respect to r,
x and g.





The derivative with respect to x says that if the information of traders
is relatively reliable (that is, if x is low, which means high variance of asset
returns, and hence placing a high weight on new information, relative to the
prior), then K increases. Therefore, when information is reliable, volatility is
more likely to increase with the entry of uninformed participants. To see this,
note that if the signals are very noisy and the information of the participants
is completely unreliable, then all investors stick to their common priors, the
price is independent from the signals and the unconditional price volatility
is zero.
The derivative with respect to g says that the lower the quality of infor-
mation of the new (uninformed) participants (lower g) with respect to the old
(informed) participants, the higher the upper bound K and, ceteris paribus,
the less likely is volatility to increase. As before, when g decreases, the ag-
gregate response of the market to news decreases, because the less informed
respond less to their information. Once again, we have the common prior
eﬀect: the stronger average weight that the market puts on the common prior
tends to lower volatility.
114 Indirect Utility
In order to study what the entry decisions of the I and U types will be, we
need to calculate the equilibrium utilities of being in the market for both
types.
4.0.1 Payoﬀst oi n f o r m e dt y p e s








































we obtain, from V
UI =( 1+r)




kxg − x(1 + r)
2 − rg(1 + r)
¢2
Proposition 3 The beneﬁt from entering of the informed increases in the
number of uninformed participants and in the variance of the uninformed






This tells us that the informed entrant is better oﬀ t h em o r eu n i n f o r m e d
are in the market and the less informed are in the market. The more precise
the information of the uniformed the more they will exploit the noise traders
leaving the informed less scope to do that.
4.0.2 Payoﬀs to uninformed types

























2 + g(r + r2 − kx)
¢2
12Proposition 4 The informed types are always better-oﬀ by being in the mar-
ket than the uninformed:
UI ≥ UU
Proof. (see Appendix).
This tell us that if in the market there are some uninformed investors
then all the informed must be participating too.
Proposition 5 The uninformed are better oﬀ by entering the more they are
participating and the less the informed investors are participating.
Proof. (see Appendix).
There are two reasons for this result. First, the more the uninformed are
the less they are exploited in per capita terms by the informed. Second, the
less informed agents are in the market, the more scope have the uninformed
to take advantage of the noise traders. This tells us that in any stable
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Utility for Informed (dashed) and Uninformed (continuous), with X=Q=b=1.
Proposition 6 There is a full participation equilibrium in which all in-
vestors enter and a limited participation in which all the informed enter and
the uninformed stay out. For some range of entry cost these equilibria coexist









Figure 2: Utility of Informed and Uninformed
Proof. (see Appendix).
The picture below shows the two stable equilibria for given entry cost c.
Where the UU crosses the cost line there is an unstable equilibrium to be
found, which we disregard.5
5 Comments and Summary
We have shown two main results: First, the more informed I-types have a
higher expected gain from entering than the less informed U-types, so, in
equilibrium, they are the ﬁrst ones to enter. Second, as the uninformed enter
the market (full participation) the volatility is higher than when the informed
are the only market participants (limited participation), provided that the
market is suﬃciently risk averse or has suﬃcient noise trading.
There are many factors that aﬀect volatility in ﬁnancial asset markets
5In the unstable equilibrium less informed investors are indiﬀerent weather to enter or
not. It is an equilibrium only if the right number of uninformed decides to enter, but a
small perturbation on that number leads to disequilibrium.
14in one direction or the other. This paper identiﬁes one of them. Using an
endogenous market participation model we showed how volatility emerges
from a change in the composition of information of investors. If the potential
market participants diﬀer in their information precision, we tried to illus-
trate what market variables are crucial in determining volatility and, more
precisely, under what conditions more participation can increase volatility.
When looking for the possible sources of volatility, we cannot disregard the
diversity of investor characteristics that arises from self-selection of potential
investor-participants. While we have explored the eﬀect of heterogeneity in
information, it would be interesting to explore the eﬀect of other kinds of
heterogeneity, the most important of these being, perhaps, wealth. This task
is left to further research.6
6 Appendix
6.1 Payoﬀs from Entering the Market
We calculate the indirect utility from entering the market for any type k.
The objective investors are maximizing upon entry is:
U (sk,p)=Ex (W | sk,p) −
b
2
Va r x (W | sk,p)
The expectations are calculated after the signal and price are realized, i.e.
conditional on them. To ﬁnd the expected utility from entering, we need to
take the expectation of U (sk,p) over all the possible signals and prices:
Esk,p [U (sk,p)] = Esk,p
·
Ex (W | sk,p) −
b
2
Va r x (W | sk,p)
¸
.
We have that, substituting Z for the optimal demand Zk,
U (sk,p)=Ex (W | sk,p) −
b
2
Va r x (W | sk,p)
= w − c + Zk [Ex (x | sk,p) − p] −
b
2
Va r x (W | sk,p)





kVa r x (x | sk,p).
6For the eﬀects of heterogeneity in risk-aversion on volatility see Herrera (2002).
15The demand of agent with signal k is:
Zk (p)=
[Ex (x | sk,p) − p]
bV arx (x | sk,p)
when p is the equilibrium price Xk is the quantity demanded in equilibrium
by agent-k. Substituting the square bracket yields:





kVa r x (x | sk,p)
Since the posterior variance of the return x does not depend on the par-
ticular signal realization, the ex-ante utility from entering is:









Va r x (x | sk,p)









Va r x (x | sk,p) >c
6.2 A conjecture
Conjecture 7 The utility of the uninformed is always increasing in G (their
information). True for r ≤ 1.













k2 (1 + X)




3 ((1 + X) − r(X + G)) + (1 + r)





2 (1 − G)+1+r









k2 (1 + X)
2 +2 k(1 + X)+8
¢




2 (1 − G)+( 1+2 X + G)
¢3 > 0
The utility of the informed in limited participation (when they are the
only ones in the market) is always smaller than their utility in full participa-
tion and always larger than the uninformed utility (in full participation, of
course). That is, for every G−1 > 1:
UU(G) <U
L
I = UI(1) <U I(G)
166.3 Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The following inequality
Va r(p)F − Va r(p)L ≥ 0






r(1 + r)(g + x)+2 g −
q
(1 + r)(g − rx)4g +( r(1 + r))
2 (x + g)
2
¶
The condition for volatility to increase with more participation is:
k<K











p =( x + g)r
4 +2( x + g)r
3 +( g − x)r




2 +4 r +4
s =( x + g)
2 r
4 +2( x + g)
2 r
3 +( g − x)
2 r
2 +4 g(g − x)r +4 g
2.
Note that the last three terms in p are negative, so we only need to show that √
qs ≥ (x + g)r4 +2( x + g)r3. To establish this inequality, notice that all
terms in both q and s are positive, so qs is greater or equal than the products


















a sw a st ob es h o w .
Turn now to dK
dg < 0. We have that
dK
dg







t =( x + g)r
3 +2( x + g)r
2 +( x − g)r − 2g
17and since t2 − (1 + r)
2 s = −(2 + 5r +4 r2 + r3)4g2r the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have that
dUI
dr
= gx(1 + r)
µ
(−r2 + r + kx+1 )k2g2 −
¡
2(1+r)




3 + kx(1 + r)
2
¶
bk (kxg − (x + r(g + x))(1 + r))
3






2g ≥ 0 ⇔− g ≤ x
we know that it is positive. The denominator is negative since g + x =







−kg(2kx+ kxr +2+2 r)+kx(2 + 5r)+
+kr3 (g + x)+kr2 (g +4 x)+2( 1+r3)+6 r(1 + r)
¶
2bk (kxg − (x + r(g + x))(1 + r))
3
which is negative because the numerator is positive and the denominator is
negative.
Proof of Proposition 4. Compare the numerators in the two utilities,
you obtain:







2bk(−kxg + x +2 rx+ xr2 + rg + r2g)
2 ≤ 0.
The inequality follows because g ≤ 0, so that the numerator must be pos-





≥ kxr2, and hence the
numerator is greater than kxr2 + kgr2 = kr2 (X + G).









(X + G)(1− G)
¡
(1 + r)
3 + k(1 + r)




2 (1 − G)+1+r
2 (1 + (1 + r)X + rG)
¢3
18P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . T h ei n d i r e c tu t i l i t yf r o me n t r yo ft h ei n f o r m e d
is always higher than the utility of the uniformed, so in any equilibrium, if
some uninformed enter the market than all the informed enter too. In any
equilibrium, the uninformed on their part either all enter or all stay out.
In the former case all informed enter too and we have a full participation
equilibrium. In the latter case, the utility of the uninformed investor is in-
dependent on how many informed are in the market (scale invariance). For
some range of entry cost (not too high) they will all enter. The full participa-
tion equilibrium is welfare improving with respect to the limited participation
equilibrium because the utility of both types of agents is increasing in the
number of uninformed entrants.
Proposition 8 ∂K




(1 − G)+r2 (1 + r)(X + G)




r3 (1 + r)(X + G)
2 +( 1− G)(2r2 (1 + X) − r(X + G) − 2(1− G))
¢




r2 (1 + r)(X + G)
2 +4 r(1 + X)(1− G)+4( 1− G)
2¢¢









r3 (1 + r)(X + G)





r2 (1 + r)(X + G)




3 (1 + r)(X + G)
2 +2 r
2 (1 − G)(1+X) < (1 − G)(r(X + G)+2( 1− G))
(which happens e.g. for small r) .I ft h ec o n v e r s ei st r u e,i e :
r
3 (1 + r)(X + G)
2 +2 r
2 (1 − G)(1+X) > (1 − G)(r(X + G)+2( 1− G))
19(which happens e.g. for r ≥ 1), then the derivative is negative provided that
the following inequality is satisﬁed:
¡
r
2 (r +2 )( X + G)
2 + r(X + G)(2− G + X)+( 1− G)
¡
G +2+3 X − r




which is true if r ≤ 1. So, in the range r ≤ 1 the derivative is negative
(for high r the derivative is also negative). The inequality (3) is obtained by




3 (1 + r)(X + G)
2 +( 1− G)
¡
2r





2 (1 + r)(X + G)
2 +4 r(1 + X)(1− G)+4( 1− G)
2¢¡
(1 − G)+r
2 (1 + r)(X + G)
¢2
and ﬁnally simplifying the algebra.
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